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Abstract
We propose a deep neural network-based algorithm to identify the Markovian Nash equilibrium of
general largeN -player stochastic differential games. Following the idea of fictitious play, we recast
theN -player game intoN decoupled decision problems (one for each player) and solve them itera-
tively. The individual decision problem is characterized by a semilinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation, to solve which we employ the recently developed deep BSDE method. The resulted al-
gorithm can solve large N -player games for which conventional numerical methods would suffer
from the curse of dimensionality. Multiple numerical examples involving identical or heteroge-
neous agents, with risk-neutral or risk-sensitive objectives, are tested to validate the accuracy of the
proposed algorithm in large group games. Even for a fifty-player game with the presence of com-
mon noise, the proposed algorithm still finds the approximate Nash equilibrium accurately, which,
to our best knowledge, is difficult to achieve by other numerical algorithms.
Keywords: stochastic differential game, Markovian Nash equilibrium, fictitious play, deep learning
1. Introduction
The development of communication technologies makes the world more interactive than ever, and
crucial decisions are generally made in a common environment nowadays where multiple play-
ers/agents1 act reciprocally. The stochastic differential game provides an elegant framework for
studying such scenarios and has been widely used in the areas of financial mathematics, economics,
management science, engineering, etc. For instance, under this framework, Carmona et al. (2015)
analyze systemic risk caused by inter-bank lending and borrowing, Achdou et al. (2017) study the
income and wealth distribution in macroeconomics, and Bensoussan et al. (2014) model the rein-
surance games between insurance companies, just to list a few.
Among all applications of stochastic differential games, a core problem is to find the Nash
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium refers to a set of all players’ strategies in which nobody has
the incentive to deviate, given the others’ strategies fixed, and a Markovian strategy means the
decision is made based only on the current situation of all players. Under the Markovian setting
in continuous time, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by N -coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equations, each of which is usually high-dimensional when N is large. In some special
settings, one can find the closed-form Nash equilibrium. However, an analytic solution is generally
unavailable, and one has to resort to numerical solutions. The notorious computational difficulty
“curse of dimensionality” is often encountered in this situation due to the high dimensionality of
1. Hereafter, we shall use player and agent interchangeably.
c© 2020 J. Han & R. Hu.
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state variables. So it is crucial but challenging to develop numerical algorithms to accurately and
efficiently find the Nash equilibrium in large N -player stochastic differential games.
In recent years the deep neural network (DNN) has shown its remarkable ability in representing
and approximating high-dimensional functions in numerical computation, ranging from artificial
intelligence (cf. Bengio (2009); LeCun et al. (2015)) such as computer vision and speech recogni-
tion, to scientific computing (see e.g., Carleo and Troyer (2017); Gao and Duan (2017); Han et al.
(2018); Zhang et al. (2018b); Han et al. (2019)). Considering the astonishing performance of the
DNN, we shall leverage it to help identify the Nash equilibrium through solving high-dimensional
coupled HJB equations. To achieve this, we design a scalable algorithm, which we refer to as deep
fictitious play, based on a combination of DNN and the idea of fictitious play. Fictitious play is an
iterative scheme in which, at each stage, the whole coupled game is decomposed to independent
decision problems for each player by considering her opponents’ strategies are fixed and following
their past play. Such a scheme enables the algorithm to be decoupled and parallel between players.
The individual decision problem is then translated into a single HJB equation and solved via the
deep BSDE method (E et al. (2017); Han et al. (2018)). Since decision problems are solved indi-
vidually for all players through general HJB equations, the algorithm can accommodate games with
arbitrary heterogeneity, and with risk-neutral or risk-sensitive cost functional. Note that the idea of
deep fictitious play is recently proposed in Hu (2019) as well for solving open-loop Nash equilib-
rium. However, due to the entirely different strategy set, the algorithm developed in Hu (2019) is
inapplicable for Markovian Nash equilibrium (see Remark 3.2 for details).
An alternative approach to studying large N -player game is mean-field game theory, introduced
by Lasry and Lions (2006a,b, 2007) and by Huang et al. (2007, 2006) around the same time. In
mean-field game theory, the limiting solution as N →∞ is used to approximate the game of finite
population. Under mild assumptions, Carmona and Delarue (2013) have shown that the approxima-
tion error is of order N−1/(d+4), where d is the dimension of each player’s state variable. The limi-
tation of the mean-field game is threefold. First, the approximation error is not well controlled for a
moderateN . Second, it requires lots of symmetry. To make the mean-field approximation work, the
players need to be indistinguishable, i.e., they control their states in the same way and have identi-
cal objectives. Third, the numerical computation of the mean-filed game is usually infeasible when
there is common noise in addition to idiosyncratic noise. In contrast to these limitations, as shown
in the description of the algorithm and numerical results, the proposed algorithm can solve general
N -player stochastic differential games with the presence of heterogeneity and common noise.
Another line of research relevant to this work is the so-called multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL) (see Busoniu et al. (2008) for an earlier review), which recently has gained increasing
research attention (see e.g. Foerster et al. (2016); Zhang et al. (2018a)), given the remarkable success
of reinforcement learning in many applications, especially accompanied with the powerful function
approximation based on DNN. The main difference is that MARL is usually model-free and in
discrete time while our work considers model-based games in continuous time, for which we can
leverage the HJB equation and BSDE reformulation to develop efficient algorithms.
In short, our algorithm focuses on the moderate number of the agents, i.e., 10 ≤ N ≤ 100, in
which case conventional numerical methods lose their efficiencies while the mean-field theory has
not yet been accurate in approximating the finite population game. The strength of the proposed
algorithm is the ability to deal with heterogeneous agents, to which scenarios mean-field games
are not good at in general, and the ease of dealing with common noise. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 gives the mathematical formulation of general N -player stochastic
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differential games in continuous time. The algorithm based on fictitious play and DNN is detailed
in Section 3, followed by numerical examples in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 and provide
technical details in appendices.
2. Mathematical Formulation
We consider N -player non-cooperative stochastic differential games described by the following
dynamics,
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t ,α(t,X
α
t )) dt+ Σ(t,X
α
t ) dWt, X0 = x0, (1)
whereXαt is anRn-valued common state process influenced by Markovian controlsα = (α1, . . . , αN ),
a collection of all players’ strategies. Each αi, as the control of player i, is a Borel measurable func-
tion [0, T ]× Rn ↪→ Ai ⊂ Rni . b and Σ are deterministic functions denoting the drift and diffusion
coefficients of the common state, b : [0, T ] × Rn × A ↪→ Rn, Σ: [0, T ] × Rn ↪→ Rn×k, where
A = ⊗Ni=1Ai is the space for joint control α, andW is a k-dimensional standard Brownian motion
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P).
Denote by Ai the set of admissible Ai-valued strategy for player i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . , N}, and
byA = ⊗Ni=1Ai the product space ofAi. Given the other’s strategy αj ∈ Aj , j 6= i, player i chooses
αi to minimize the cumulative cost J i0,
J it (α) := E
[∫ T
t
f i(s,Xαs ,α(s,X
α
s )) ds+ g
i(XαT )
]
, (2)
or its risk-sensitive version
J it (α) := E
[
θi exp
{
θi
(∫ T
t
f i(s,Xαs ,α(s,X
α
s ) dt+ g
i(XαT )
)}]
, (3)
where the running cost f i : [0, T ]×Rn×A ↪→ R and the terminal cost gi : Rn ↪→ R are deterministic
measurable functions.
We are interested in solving the above game in terms of finding the Nash equilibrium, in partic-
ular, the Markovian Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 A Markovian Nash equilibrium is a tuple α∗ = (α1,∗, . . . , αN,∗) ∈ A such that
∀i ∈ I, and αi ∈ Ai, J i0(α∗) ≤ J i0(α1,∗, . . . , αi−1,∗, αi, αi+1,∗, . . . , αN,∗).
The above problem (1)–(3) is more general than the usual finite-player stochastic differential
games or mean-field games in two aspects. Firstly, in addition to the usual (risk-neutral) cost func-
tional (2), we also consider a risk-sensitive version (3), where θi is a parameter characterizing how
risk-averse/seeking player i is. This flexibility allows us to model much broader classes of games
that accommodate the players’ attitudes to risk. Secondly and more importantly,Xt in (1) is a com-
mon state process that is influenced by all players, as opposed to the traditional case that player i
can only control her private state. The former feature is common in the literature of economics (see
e.g., Dockner et al. (2000); Prasad and Sethi (2004); Van Long (2011)), thus, we think it is impor-
tant to include it in (1). However, this leads to a stronger coupling problem, which is unsurprisingly
harder to deal with both theoretically and numerically. The difficulty even persists in the limiting
problem as N → ∞ with indistinguishable players, when allowing αi entering into others’ states.
3
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This is called the extended mean-field game and it has attracted lots of attention recently (see e.g.,
Gomes and Voskanyan (2013); Gomes et al. (2014); Gomes and Voskanyan (2016); Cardaliaguet
and Lehalle (2018)).
Note that by choosing b and Σ in (1) properly, one can reduce the formulation (1) to the simpler
case where each player controls her private state through αi. We highlight this relation in the
following remark.
Remark 2.2 Let n = dN and b` ≡ b`(t,x, αi) for ` = (i− 1)d+ 1, . . . , id, then the problem (1)–
(3) is the usual modeling in financial mathematics literature, where the ith player’s d-dimensional
private state (X(i−1)d+1t , . . . , Xidt ) is controlled by αi only. A benchmark example we shall study
in Section 4.1 is a model of inter-bank borrowing and lending proposed in Carmona et al. (2015),
where d = 1, and the dynamics for each player is
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit) + αit] dt+ σ
(
ρ dW 0t +
√
1− ρ2W it
)
, Xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit .
In the Markovian setting, finding a Nash equilibrium is related to solving N -coupled HJB equa-
tions. To this end, we define the value function of player i by
V i(t,x) = inf
αi∈Ai
E[J it (α)|Xt = x].
Using the dynamic programming principle, the HJB system readsV
i
t + inf
αi∈Ai
Gi(t,x,α,∇xV i, V i) + 1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) = 0,
V i(T,x) = gi(x), i ∈ I,
(4)
where Gi is given by
under objective (2), Gi = Gi(t,x,α,p) = b(t,x,α) · p+ f i(t,x,α),
under objective (3), Gi = Gi(t,x,α,p, s) = b(t,x,α) · p+ θisf i(t,x,α).
Here∇xV, HessxV denote the gradient and the Hessian of function V respect to x and Tr denotes
the trace of a matrix. In the risk-neutral case (2),Gi is in fact the Hamiltonian and is usually denoted
by H i. Nevertheless, to unify the notation between two objectives (2) and (3), we shall stick to
Gi(t,x,α,p, s) for the rest of the paper, although it does not depend on s under objective (2). Note
that while minimizing αi in the equation for V i in (4), the policies (α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN )
are given and fixed. In other words, V i implicitly depends on the other players’ strategies, thus on
V j .
Throughout the paper, we assume that there is a unique classical solution to the HJB system
(4). Moreover, we require that the minimizer arg minαi∈Ai Gi(t,x,α,p, s) exists, is unique and
explicit in other arguments, ∀ i ∈ I, (t,x,p, s) and αj ∈ Aj with j 6= i.
3. Methodology
3.1. Fictitious Play
Fictitious play was firstly introduced by Brown in the static game Brown (1949, 1951), and was
recently adapted to the mean-field setting by Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo (2017); Briani and
4
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Cardaliaguet (2018). It is a simple yet important learning idea in game theory. The key is to
decouple the N -player game into N individual decision problems where opponents’ strategies are
fixed and assumed to follow their past play. These N individual problems are solved iteratively,
starting from stage 1. At stagem, we assume that the opponents’ strategies are their stage (m−1)’s
best responses. To better describe this procedure mathematically, we first summarize the notations
that shall be used below.
• Ai ⊂ Rni , the range of player i’s strategy αi. A = ⊗Ni=1Ai, the control space for all
players, and A−i = ⊗j 6=iAj , the control space for all players but i. The same applies to the
admissible spaces of measurable functions Ai, A and A−i. Note that, with these notations,
infαi∈Ai and infαi∈Ai means seeking for an optimal vector in Ai and Ai-valued function
(strategy), respectively.
• α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ), a collection of all players’ strategy profiles. With a negative super-
script, α−i = (α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN ) means the strategy profiles excluding player i’s.
If a non-negative superscript m appears, αm is a N -tuple standing for the strategies of all
players at stage m. When both exist, α−i,m = (α1,m, . . . , αi−1,m, αi+1,m, . . . , αN,m) is a
(N − 1)-tuple representing strategies excluding player i at stage m.
Assume that we start with a guess of the solution α0 ∈ A. The idea of fictitious play motivates
us to consider an iterative algorithm according to the following rules. At stagem+1,αm is observed
by all players, and player i’s decoupled decision problem is
inf
αi∈Ai
J i0(α
i;α−i,m), (5)
where J i0 is defined in (2) or (3), and the state process Xt is given in (1) with α being replaced
by (αi,α−i,m). The optimal strategy, if ever exists, is denoted by αi,m+1. The problem (5) for all
i ∈ I are solved simultaneously using α−i,m, and the optimal responses together form αm+1. Due
to the Markovian structure, the problem (5) is translated into a HJB equation
V i,m+1t + inf
αi∈Ai
Gi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m(t,x)),∇xV i,m+1, V i,m+1) + 1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV i,m+1Σ) = 0,
(6)
with the terminal condition V i,m+1(T,x) = gi(x). If the classical solution ever exists, the optimal
strategy at stage m+ 1 for player i is given by
αi,m+1(t,x) = arg min
αi∈Ai
Gi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m(t,x)),∇xV i,m+1(t,x), V i,m+1(t,x)). (7)
Solving (6) for all i ∈ I completes one stage in the loop of fictitious play.
Given the iterative procedure described above, one can naturally ask: (1) does αi,m always
exist; (2) if yes, does αm converge; and (3) if yes, is the limiting strategy α∞ admissible and
does it form a Nash equilibrium. The first question closely depends on the choice of the initial
belief α0. Usually a regular enough α0 (plus regular b,Σ, f i, gi) will ensure the unique classical
solution V i,1, thus ensure the existence of α1. Then it is likely that the regularity of α persists from
stage to stage. The remaining two questions are tough in general. For the second question, there
is no universal criterion that can guarantee the convergence. Even in the static finite-action games,
5
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there are numerous examples when it converges (Robinson (1951); Miyasawa (1961); Milgrom and
Roberts (1991); Monderer and Shapley (1996b,a); Berger (2005); Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002))
and when it does not (Shapley (1964); Jordan (1993); Monderer and Sela (1996); Foster and Young
(1998); Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998)). The third question is related to the stability of the game, and
has to be analyzed case by case.
Instead of answering the theoretical questions raised above, this paper focuses on a practical
numerical scheme for finding the Markovian Nash equilibrium, especially when N is large. As
proof of methodology, we shall present four examples to show the performance of the proposed
algorithm. These examples cover a large variety of stochastic differential games, including homo-
geneous/heterogeneous, risk-neutral/risk-sensitive ones. We remark that the first three examples are
chosen so that they have closed-form solutions or can be solved via other numerical approaches in
low dimensions, such that we can benchmark numerical solutions. The algorithm in fact can be
applied in much more general games, as demonstrated in the last example.
Remark 3.1 The learning procedure described above is slightly different from the original version
proposed by Brown (1949, 1951) where two-player normal-form games are studied. Targeting at
pure or mixed Nash equilibrium, the player therein chooses the best response against the empirical
distribution of her opponent’s past play. That is, if her opponent uses strategies α1, . . . , αk during
the first k stages, where αi is from a finite strategy set, then at stage k + 1, her response will be
a pure strategy that maximizes her expected payoff with respect to her opponent’s mixed strategy
1
k
∑k
i=1 δαi .
In this paper, we prefer to use the last stage information, instead of the average of the past. The
reason will be explained after we introduce our deep learning algorithm, see Remark 3.2.
3.2. A Deep Learning Algorithm Based on Fictitious Play
In order to find the Markovian Nash equilibrium through fictitious play, the main challenge is nu-
merically solving the PDE (6) at each stage. When the dimension d is large, conventional numerical
algorithms soon lose their efficiency. Here we employ the deep BSDE method in E et al. (2017);
Han et al. (2018) to deal with the high-dimensionality.
Instead of solving the parabolic PDE (6), the deep BSDE method recasts the problem into an
optimization problem based on the associated BSDE. Under the standing assumptions, the function
αi,m+1(t,x,p, s;α−i,m) = arg minαi∈Ai Gi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m(t,x)),p, s) is unique and explicit.
We plug it into (6) and rewrite the equation as a semilinear parabolic PDE:
V i,m+1t +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV i,m+1Σ) + µi(t,x;α−i,m) · ∇xV i,m+1
+ hi(t,x, V i,m+1,ΣT∇xV i,m+1;α−i,m) = 0.
Note that we replace ∇xV i,m+1 by ΣT∇xV i,m+1 in the term hi for the sake of simplicity when
describing the algorithm, and that we treatα−i,m as known functions of the PDE due to its exogene-
ity. The concrete equations of the considered numerical examples are presented in the associated
subsections or Appendix A. For less cumbersome notations, we drop the superscript m that denotes
the index of fictitious play and consider the PDEV it +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) + µi(t,x;α−i) · ∇xV i + hi(t,x, V i,ΣT∇xV i;α−i) = 0,
V i(T,x) = gi(x).
(8)
6
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This PDE is intimately related to the following BSDE:
Xit = x0 +
∫ t
0
µi(s,Xis;α
−i(s,Xis)) ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xis) dWs,
Y it = g
i(XiT ) +
∫ T
t
hi(s,Xis, Y
i
s ,Z
i
s;α
−i(s,Xis)) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zis)
T dWs,
(9)
(10)
where Wt is a k-dimensional Brownian motion and x0 is a square-integrable random variable in-
dependent of Wt. Specifically, the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula (cf. Pardoux and Peng (1992);
El Karoui et al. (1997); Pardoux and Tang (1999)) states that, under certain regularity conditions,
Y it = V
i(t,Xit) and Z
i
t = Σ(t,X
i
t)
T∇xV i(t,Xit) (11)
defines the unique solution to the BSDE (9)–(10). Accordingly, we consider the variational problem
inf
Y i0 ,{Zit}0≤t≤T
E|gi(XiT )− Y iT |2, (12)
s.t. Xit = x0 +
∫ t
0
µi(s,Xis;α
−i(s,Xis)) ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xis) dWs,
Y it = Y
i
0 −
∫ t
0
hi(s,Xis, Y
i
s ,Z
i
s;α
−i(s,Xis)) ds+
∫ t
0
(Zis)
T dWs,
where Y i0 isF0-measurable and square-integrable, andZit is aFt-adapted square-integrable process.
Eq. (11) gives a minimizer of the above problem since the loss function attains zero when it is
evaluated according to (11). In addition, if the BSDE (9)–(10) is wellposed (under some regularity
conditions), the minimizer must exist and is unique.
The deep BSDE method builds on the temporal discretization of (12). Given a partition pi of
size NT on the time interval [0, T ], 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tNT = T , we consider the discretized
version of (12) based on the Euler scheme (the subscript tk in X, Y,Z has been replaced by k for
simplicity):
inf
ψ0∈N i′0 , {φk∈N ik}
NT−1
k=0
E|gi(Xi,piNT )− Y
i,pi
NT
|2, (13)
s.t. Xi,pi0 = x0, Y
i,pi
0 = ψ0(X
i,pi
0 ), Z
i,pi
k = φk(X
i,pi
k ), k = 0, . . . , NT − 1
Xi,pik+1 = X
i,pi
k + µ
i(tk,X
i,pi
k ;α
−i(tk,X
i,pi
k ))∆tk + Σ(tk,X
i,pi
k )∆Wk, (14)
Y i,pik+1 = Y
i,pi
k − hi(tk,Xi,pik , Y i,pik ,Zi,pik ;α−i(tk,Xi,pik ))∆tk + (Zi,pik )T∆Wk, (15)
where ∆tk = tk+1 − tk, ∆Wk = Wtk+1 −Wtk . Here N i
′
0 and {N ik}NT−1k=0 are hypothesis
spaces of player i related to deep neural networks. The goal of the optimization is to find optimal
deterministic maps ψi,∗0 , {φi,∗k }NT−1k=0 such that the loss function is small. Intuitively, we expect that
(13) defines a benign optimization problem close to (12) and ψi,∗0 , {φi,∗k }NT−1k=0 provide us good
approximations to V i(0, ·), {∇xV i(tk, ·)}NT−1k=0 , the solution of the original PDE (8).
In practice, the expectation in (13) is approximated by the standard Monte Carlo sampling of
(14)–(15). Given sample paths of {Xi,pik }NTk=0 and the associated white noises {Wtk}NTk=0, one notes
that the loss function (13) can be interpreted as the final output of a very deep network after stacking
7
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all the subnetworks ψi0, {φik}NT−1k=0 in sequence according to (15). This means that we can use
backpropagation to derive the gradient of the loss function with respect to all the parameters in the
neural networks and use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to optimize all the parameters. We refer
the interested readers to E et al. (2017); Han et al. (2018); Han and Long (2018) for more detailed
description and theoretical justification of the deep BSDE method.
Remark 3.2 According to the deep BSDE method, the best responses at stage m, αm(t,x), are
defined through the outputs of neural networks. Due to the direct feedback nature, Xt changes as
strategies vary from stage to stage, so do the function evaluationsαm(t,Xt). Therefore, if one were
interested in using α−i,m := 1m
∑m
`=1α
−i,` to replace α−i,m in (5), the parameters of all neural
networks from stage 1 to m need to be saved, which is infeasible for the sake of computational
memory. This is indeed the very reason that we use α−i,m in objective (5).
Note that this is not the case for searching open-loop Nash equilibrium. There, αm are adapted
processes to the filtration generated by Brownian motions, i.e., one can intuitively think αm as
functions of W[0,T ], thus do not change as strategies/states vary, as long as the training paths of
W are fixed. Therefore, using α−i,m only requires constant memory, since one can update it by a
weighted sum of α−i,m−1 and α−i,m.
For further discussion on this discrepancy, we refer to a closely related work by Hu (2019)
where a deep learning scheme is designed for open-loop Nash equilibrium based on fictitious play.
Indeed, it is empirically observed in Hu (2019) that using α−i,m leads to faster convergence in
the open-loop case. We would expect the similar phenomenon in the Markovian case, if we were
able to record all the best responses αm(t,x). However, as discussed above, due to the direct
feedback nature, merely adapting the algorithm in Hu (2019) will not be efficient nor parallelizable
for finding Markovian Nash equilibrium, and a completely different approach is necessary.
3.3. Implementation
A few details should be specified regarding the methodology described in Section 3.2.
First, the hypothesis spaces N i′0 and {N ik}NT−1k=0 need to be specified. Note that, at each stage
m, the optimal policy is defined through
αi,m(t,x) = arg min
αi∈Ai
Gi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m−1(t,x)),∇xV i,m(t,x), V i,m(t,x)),
one wishes to have direct access to the solved V i,m(t,x). Therefore we parametrize V i(t,x) (the
superscript m is dropped again for simplicity) directly with a neural network, denoted by Net(t,x).
Accordingly, Net(0,x) becomes a hypothesis function inN i′0 . ForN ik, we know from the nonlinear
Feynman-Kac formula (11) that Σ(t,x)∇xV i(t,x) is the optimal map definingZit in the variational
problem (12). Hence we choose Σ(tk,x)∇xNet(tk,x) to be a hypothesis function in N ik. In other
words, the hypothesis functions in N i′0 and {N ik}NT−1k=0 all share the same set of parameters. In
this work, we use a fully-connected feedforward network with three hidden layers to instantiate
Net(t,x). The detailed architecture of Net(t,x) are provided in Appendix B.
Second, at each stage m, we seek for an approximate solution to the PDE (8) for each player i,
by iteratively updating the parameters of the neural networks. Note that the neural networks for N
players are decoupled and can be optimized in parallel. In our practice, the Adam method (Kingma
and Ba (2015)), a variant of SGD, is used to optimize the parameters. A relevant question is how
many SGD iteration steps should be used per stage. After testing with different choices, we decide
8
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to use a moderate number as the iteration steps (see the discussion in Section 4.1 for details). In
fact, it is unwise to solve (8) accurately at each stage with a lot of SGD updates, especially at early
stages, as the opponents’ strategies used for computing the best response are not even close to the
Nash equilibrium. A similar idea of solving individual control problems not so accurately at each
stage has also been used in Seale and Burnett (2006). On the other hand, since the parameters
are continued to be updated incrementally from the previous stage without re-initialization, it still
suffices to expect the algorithm to converge with a moderate number of SGD updates per stage.
With the implementation details explained above, the pseudo-code of the proposed deep ficti-
tious play algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Deep Fictitious Play for Finding Markovian Nash Equilibrium
Require: N = # of players, NT = # of subintervals on [0, T ], M = # of total stages in fictitious
play, Nsample = # of sample paths generated for each player at each stage of fictitious play,
NSGD per stage = # of SGD steps for each player at each stage, Nbatch = batch size per SGD
update, α0 : the initial policies that are smooth enough
1: Initialize N deep neural networks to represent V i,0, i ∈ I
2: for m← 1 to M do
3: for all i ∈ I do in parallel
4: Generate Nsample sample paths {Xi,pik }NTk=0 according to (14) and the realized optimal poli-
cies α−i,m−1(tk,X
i,pi
k )
5: for `← 1 to NSGD per stage do
6: Update the parameters of the ith neural network one step with Nbatch paths using the
SGD algorithm (or its variant), based on the loss function (13)
7: end for
8: Obtain the approximate optimal policy αi,m according to (7)
9: end for
10: Collect the optimal policies at stage m: αm ← (α1,m, . . . , αN,m)
11: end for
12: return The optimal policy αM
4. Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate our algorithm on four examples, including games with identical or
heterogeneous agents, and risk-neutral or risk-sensitive cost. In the main text we shall mainly focus
on introducing the game setups and presenting numerical results. Technical details, such as concrete
PDEs we aim to solve and the associated ground truth solutions V i, will be kept to the minimal level.
They, together with the hyperparameters and runtime of learning, are deferred to Appendices A and
B.
4.1. An Inter-Bank Borrowing and Lending Game
Our first example models an inter-bank game concerning the systemic risk (Carmona et al. (2015)).
Consider an inter-bank market with N banks, and let Xit ∈ R be the log-monetary reserves of bank
9
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i at time t. We model its dynamics as the following diffusion processes,
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit) + αit] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2W it
)
, Xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit , i ∈ I. (16)
Here a(Xt − Xit) represents the rate at which bank i borrows from or lends to other banks in the
lending market, while αit denotes its control rate of cash flows to a central bank. The standard
Brownian motions {W it }Ni=0 are independent, in which {W it , i ≥ 1} stands for the idiosyncratic
noises and W 0t denotes the systemic shock, or so-called common noise in the general context. To
describe the model in the form of (1), we concatenate the log-monetary reserves Xit of N banks to
formXαt = [X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ]
T. The associated drift term and diffusion term are defined as
b(t,x,α) = [a(x¯− x1) + α1, . . . , a(x¯− xN ) + αN ]T ∈ RN×1, x¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi, (17)
Σ(t,x) =

σρ σ
√
1− ρ2 0 · · · 0
σρ 0 σ
√
1− ρ2 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
σρ 0 0 · · · σ
√
1− ρ2
 ∈ RN×(N+1), (18)
and Wt = (W 0t , . . . ,W
N
t ) is (N + 1)-dimensional. The cost functional (2) that player i wishes to
minimize has the form
f i(t,x,α) =
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(x¯− xi) + 
2
(x¯− xi)2, gi(x) = c
2
(x¯− xi)2.
All the aforementioned parameters a, σ, q, , c are non-negative with |ρ| ≤ 1 and q2 ≤ . We direct
the interested readers to Carmona et al. (2015) for the detailed interpretation of this model.
The coupled HJB system corresponding to this game reads
∂tV
i + inf
αi

N∑
j=1
[a(x¯− xj) + αj ]∂xjV i +
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x¯− xi) + 
2
(x¯− xi)2

+
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) = 0,
V i(T,x) =
c
2
(x¯− xi)2, i ∈ I.
(19)
The minimizer in the infimum gives a candidate of the optimal control for player i: αi(t,x) =
q(x¯− xi)− ∂xiV i(t,x). Plugging it back into the ith equation yields a PDE of form (8):
∂tV
i +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) + a(x¯− xi)∂xiV i +
∑
j 6=i
[a(x¯− xj) + αj(t,x)]∂xjV i
+

2
(x¯− xi)2 − 1
2
(q(x¯− xi)− ∂xiV i)2 = 0,
10
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Figure 1: The relative squared errors of V i (left) and ∇V i (right) along the training process of
deep fictitious play for the inter-bank game in Section 4.1. The relative squared errors of
V i(0,Xi,pi0 ) and {∇V i(tk,Xi,pik )}NT−1k=0 are evaluated. The error is computed every 400
SGD updates, averaged over all the players. A smoothed moving average with window
size 3 is applied in the final plots.
where αj with j 6= i are considered exogenous for player i’s problem, and are given by the best
responses of the other players from the previous stage. To be precise, µi and hi in (8) are defined
as:
µi(t,x;α−i) = [a(x¯− x1) + α1, . . . , a(x¯− xi), . . . , a(x¯− xN ) + αN ]T,
hi(t,x, y,z;α−i) =

2
(x¯− xi)2 − 1
2
(q(x¯− xi)− z
i
σ
√
1− ρ2 )
2,
in which z = (z0, z1, . . . , zN ) ∈ RN+1.
Figures 1–2 show the performance of our algorithm on a 10-player game, using the parameter:
a = 0.1, q = 0.1, c = 0.5,  = 0.5, ρ = 0.2, σ = 1, T = 1. (20)
We define the relative squared error by
RSE =
∑
i∈I
1≤j≤J
(
V i(0,x
(j)
t0
)− V̂ i(0,x(j)t0 )
)2
∑
i∈I
1≤j≤J
(
V i(0,x
(j)
t0
)− V¯ i
)2 , or RSE =
∑
i∈I
0≤k≤NT−1
1≤j≤J
(
∇xV i(tk,x(j)tk )−∇xV̂ i(tk,x
(j)
tk
)
)2
∑
i∈I
0≤k≤NT−1
1≤j≤J
(
∇xV i(tk,x(j)tk )−∇xV
i
)2 ,
where V i is given by the explicit formula provided in Appendix A.1, Vˆ i is the prediction from the
neural networks, and V¯ i (resp.∇xV i) is the average of V i (resp.∇xV i) evaluated at all the indices
j, k. To compute the relative error, we generate J = 256 ground truth sample paths {x(j)tk }NT−1k=0
using Euler scheme based on (1)(17)(18) and the true optimal strategy (provided in Appendix A.1).
Note that the superscript (j) here does not mean the player index, but the jth path for all players. The
relative errors reported in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are defined in the same way. Figure 1 in particular
compares the relative squared error as NSGD per stage varies from 10 to 400. The convergence of
the learning curves with small NSGD per stage asserts that each individual problem does not need to
11
DEEP FICTITIOUS PLAY FOR FINDING MARKOVIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
X
t
an
d
Xˆ
t
X1t
Xˆ1t
X2t
Xˆ2t
X3t
Xˆ3t
X4t
Xˆ4t
X5t
Xˆ5t
X6t
Xˆ6t
X7t
Xˆ7t
X8t
Xˆ8t
X9t
Xˆ9t
X10t
Xˆ10t
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Time t
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
α
t
an
d
αˆ
t
α1t
αˆ1t
α2t
αˆ2t
α3t
αˆ3t
α4t
αˆ4t
α5t
αˆ5t
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Time t
α6t
αˆ6t
α7t
αˆ7t
α8t
αˆ8t
α9t
αˆ9t
α10t
αˆ10t
Figure 2: A sample path for each player of the inter-bank game in Section 4.1 with N = 10. Top:
the optimal state process Xit (solid lines) and its approximation Xˆ
i
t (circles) provided
by the optimized neural networks, under the same realized path of Brownian motion.
Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit and αˆ
i
t (dashed lines).
be solved so accurately. Furthermore, the similar performances under different NSGD per stage with
the same total budget of SGD updates suggests that the algorithm is insensitive to the choice of
this hyperparameter. In all the following numerical experiments, we fix NSGD per stage = 100. The
final relative squared errors of V and ∇V averaged from three independent runs of deep fictitious
play are 4.6% and 0.2%, respectively. Figure 2 presents one sample path for each player of the
optimal state processXit and the optimal control α
i
t vs. their approximations Xˆ
i
t , αˆ
i
t provided by the
optimized neural networks.
One concern is that how sensitive the numerical result is to the parameters chosen in (20).
For instance, in solving mean-field games, the numerical algorithms may produce bifurcations (cf.
Angiuli et al. (2018); Chassagneux et al. (2019)). To show the robustness (within a certain range
of parameters) of our algorithm, we conduct two experiments by increasing the game length T , and
the coupling between players described by a. The results are provided in Appendix C.
4.2. A Risk-Sensitive Version of the Inter-Bank Game in Section 4.1
Next we consider the same inter-bank game as in Section 4.1, but under risk-sensitive utility (3). The
cases θi < 0, θi > 0 correspond respectively to what an economist would term risk-preferring and
risk-averse attitudes on the expected utility. Finding the Nash equilibrium of this game is reduced
12
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to solving N -coupled matrix Riccati equations. Its derivation, as well as the concrete form of PDE
(8) is presented in Appendix A.2.
For numerical illustration, we study a game of 10 heterogeneous players, with risk-sensitivity
θi = 0.6 + 0.02i. Other parameters follow (20) except c = 0.3,  = 0.3. As before, Figure 3
compares the sample paths of the true optimal states/control vs. the approximated ones produced by
the proposed deep fictitious play algorithm. The final relative squared errors of V and∇V averaged
from three independent runs are 1.4% and 0.1%, respectively.
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Figure 3: A sample path for each player of the risk-sensitive inter-bank game in Section 4.2 with
N = 10. Top: the optimal state process Xit (solid lines) and its approximation Xˆ
i
t
(circles) provided by the optimized neural networks, under the same realized path of
Brownian motion. Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit and αˆ
i
t (dashed lines).
4.3. A General Linear-Quadratic Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Game
In this section, we consider a general linear-exponential-quadratic game of the form (1):
b(t,x,α) = Ax+
N∑
i=1
Biα
i(t,x), Σ(t,x) = Σ,
where A ∈ Rn×n, Bi ∈ Rn×ni , Σ ∈ Rn×n are constant matrices, Σ is of full rank, x ∈
Rn, αi : [0, T ] × Rn → Rni . In contrast to the first two examples in which each player i can
only control her own state Xi, here the control αi of each player i contributes to the dynamics of
13
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the common state X through a general linear relationship. The cost functional for each player is
risk-sensitive of the form (3) with:
f i(t,x,α) =
1
2
xTQix+
1
2
(αi)TRiα
i, gi(x) =
1
2
xTMix,
whereQi ∈ Rn×n,Ri ∈ Rni×ni andMi ∈ Rn×n are symmetric, positive definite constant matrices.
As before, one can solve N -coupled matrix Riccati equations to obtain the Nash equilibrium.
The technical details are deferred to Appendix A.3, and we shall focus on the numerics. We present
a 10-player heterogeneous game in which the dimensions of the state Xt and the controls αi are
all 10, i.e., n = ni = 10. The risk-sensitive parameters are the same as in Section 4.2, i.e.,
θi = 0.6 + 0.02i. Denote by I10 ∈ R10×10 the identity matrix, and let Bi = Ri = 0.4I10,Σ = I10.
The matrices A,Qi,Mi are defined by
A = 0.1I10 + 0.05(A˜+ A˜
T), Qi = 0.1I10 + 0.05(Q˜i + Q˜i
T
), Mi = 0.2I10 + 0.1(M˜i + M˜i
T
).
Here A˜, Q˜i, M˜i are all random matrices whose diagonal entries are 0 and off-diagonal entries are
independently sampled from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. Hence the game is entirely hetero-
geneous due to different θi, Qi,Mi. As before, we illustrate the sample paths of the true optimal
state process/policy vs. the approximated ones in Figure 4. The final relative squared errors of V
and ∇V averaged from three independent trials are 6.5% and 0.4%, respectively.
4.4. A Variant of the Inter-Bank Game in Section 4.1 withN = 50
In this section we first recompute the example in Section 4.1 with all the same parameters as in
(20) but N = 50 to test the performance of the proposed deep fictitious play with even more
players. Since this game is totally symmetric for all the players, the fictitious play in fact reduces
it into N identical decision problems. Due to this, at each stage of the fictitious play, if all the
players use the same strategy, then the updated strategies for them are still essentially the same.
Therefore we can leverage such symmetry of the game to reduce the computational cost when
N is large. Specifically, we impose that all the players always share the same strategy at each
stage by using a single network to derive each player’s strategy. Consequently, at each stage, only
one player’s decision problem needs to be solved by the deep BSDE method to update the neural
network-based strategy. Algorithm 1 is accordingly simplified, whose details are provided in the
Appendix B. After solving (19) with the deep fictitious play, we simulate 10,000 paths following
the optimized neural network, and we plot the histograms of XˆT and αˆT in Figure 5 by considering
all 50 components together, i.e., the histograms are generated by 500,000 data points. Note that
due to all the symmetry of this problem, the distribution of each component is identical. Therefore
considering them together empirically does not change the underlying distribution but reduces the
variance. Figure 5 shows great consistency between the histograms obtained from the optimized
strategies/paths (blue dashed lines) and true optimal strategies/paths (black solid lines).
Convinced by the reliability of the algorithm with a large number of players, we further consider
a variant of the example in Section 4.1 withN = 50 again. In contrast to (16), the drift term becomes
nonlinear
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit)3 + αit] dt+ σ
(
ρ dW 0t +
√
1− ρ2W it
)
. (21)
In this case, as far as the authors are aware, there is no analytic solution or simple characterization of
the Nash equilibrium suitable for numerical computation. For the corresponding mean-field game,
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Figure 4: A sample path for each player of the general linear-exponential-quadratic game in Sec-
tion 4.3 with N = 10. Top: the optimal state process Xi,t (solid lines) and its approxi-
mation Xˆi,t (circles) provided by the optimized neural networks, under the same realized
path of Brownian motion. Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit and αˆ
i
t (dashed lines).
due to the presence of common noise, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a coupled system
of stochastic partial differential equations, which is also very difficult, if not impossible, to solve
numerically. In computation of the deep fictitious play, we set a = 10 in order to compensate the
smaller drift near 0 and all other parameters the same as in (20). It turns out that the algorithm still
finds reasonable equilibrium for this problem, as shown in Figure 5 as well. For XiT , since the drift
term a(Xt − Xit)3 is superlinear, the final distribution of XiT is expected to be more concentrated
than the one under linear drift, which is normal distributed with kurtosis 3. It is confirmed in the
left panel of Figure 5, in which the kurtosis of the orange dashed line is 2.72 < 3. For αiT , if X
i
t
is far away from the average, the superlinear term a(Xt − Xit)3 will push it back quickly, saving
some effort of bank i and reducing αit. Therefore the tail of α
i
T is much lighter than the Gaussian
distribution (with kurtosis 2.36 < 3), as shown in the right panel of Figure 5.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a deep fictitious play algorithm to compute the Markovian Nash equilib-
rium of large N -player stochastic differential games. The game is firstly decoupled into N individ-
ual decision problems by the idea of fictitious play, and then each is solved iteratively. Due to the
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Figure 5: The densities of XiT (left) and α
i
T (right) of the inter-bank game with N = 50. We plot
the true distribution of the linear dynamics (16) (black solid lines), and the distributions
obtained from the deep fictitious play with the linear dynamics (16) (blue dashed lines)
and superlinear dynamics (21) (orange dashed lines).
feedback nature of Markovian Nash equilibrium, it is inefficient to directly parameterize the optimal
policy as in Hu (2019). Instead, we rely on the HJB approach and solve it through the deep BSDE
method. Three examples with closed-form solutions are carefully examined, and the algorithm per-
forms unanimously well. The fourth example without tractability is also presented evidencing the
algorithm’s applicability to general games without the linear-(exponential)-quadratic structure.
Future work includes the convergence analysis on the proposed algorithm and more practical
applications in other disciplines such as operation research and economics. For stochastic differen-
tial games involving controlling volatility, it is also promising to use the deep fictitious play to find
the Nash equilibrium, by combining a second-order BSDE formulation.
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Appendix A. Technical Details to Numerical Examples
A.1. The Analytic Solution in Section 4.1
The results in this section is firstly derived in (Carmona et al., 2015, Section 3), and we repeat them
here for completeness. Assume the following ansatz for the HJB system (19):
V i(t,x) =
η(t)
2
(x¯− xi)2 + µ(t), i ∈ I,
where η(t), µ(t) are two scalar functions to be determined. Under this ansatz the optimal feedback
control becomes
αi,∗(t,x) =
[
q + η(t)(1− 1
N
)
]
(x¯− xi).
Plugging the ansatz into (19) and collecting the coefficients of the squared and constant terms, we
find that η(t) solves a Riccati equation
η˙(t) = 2(a+ q)η(t) + (1− 1/N2)η2(t)− (− q2), η(T ) = c,
and µ(t) depends on η(t) through:
µ˙(t) = −1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)(1− 1/N)η(t), µ(T ) = 0.
The solution to the Riccati equation is
η(t) =
−(− q2)(e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1)− c(δ+e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ−)
(δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)− c(1− 1/N2)(e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1) ,
where δ± = −(a+ q)±√R, and R = (a+ q)2 + (1− 1/N2)(− q2).
A.2. Technical Details in Section 4.2
In this risk-sensitive dynamic game, the Nash equilibrium is related to the following system:
∂tV
i + inf
αi

N∑
j=1
[a(x¯− xj) + αj ]∂xjV i + V iθi
(
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x¯− xi) + 
2
(x¯− xi)2
)
+
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) = 0,
V i(T,x) = θi exp
{
θi
c
2
(x¯− xi)2
}
,
(22)
and the candidate of player i’s optimal strategy is given by
αi(t,x) = q(x¯− xi)− ∂xiV
i(t,x)
θiV i(t,x)
. (23)
Observing the exponential quadratic form in the terminal condition and in the cost functional,
we assume the following ansatz
V i(t,x) = θi exp
{
θi
(
1
2
xTP i(t)x+ pi(t)
)}
, i ∈ I,
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where P i(t) ∈ Rn×n, pi(t) ∈ R are two (matrix) functions to be determined. Under this ansatz the
optimal feedback control becomes
αi,∗(t,x) = q(x¯− xi)− P i(t)x.
Plugging the ansatz into (22) and collecting the coefficients of the squared and constant terms, we
find that P i(t) and pi(t) satisfy
P˙ i+2(a+q)AP i−2
N∑
j=1
(P j)T∆j,jP
i+(P i)T(∆i,i+θiΣΣ
T)P i+(−q2)eieTi = 0, P i(T ) = ceieTi ,
and
p˙i(t) +
1
2
Tr(ΣTP i(t)Σ) = 0, pi(T ) = 0.
Here we have used the notation
A = (Ai,j) = (
1
N
− δi,j), ei =
[ 1
N
, . . . ,
1
N
,
1
N
− 1
↑
ith
,
1
N
, . . . ,
1
N
]T
,
Bi = [0, . . . , 0, 1↑
ith
, 0, . . . , 0]T, ∆i,i = BiB
T
i ,
and Σ is defined as in (17). The solutions of P i(t) and pi(t) then can be obtained through high-
precision numerical integration. Note that these matrix Riccati equations for {P i(t), i ∈ I} are
coupled, while pi(t) depends solely on P i(t).
To obtain the HJB equation for the individual decision problem decoupled by fictitious play, we
plugin (23) into (22) and deduce
∂tV
i +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) + a(x¯− xi)∂xiV i +
∑
j 6=i
[a(x¯− xj) + αj(t,x)]∂xjV i
+θiV
i
(

2
(x¯− xi)2 − 1
2
(
q(x¯− xi)− ∂xiV
i
θiV i
)2)
= 0.
This is indeed of the form (8), with µi(t,x;α−i) following the definition in Section 4.1, and hi
given by:
hi(t,x, y, z;α−i) = θiy
(

2
(x¯− xi)2 − 1
2
(q(x¯− xi)− z
i
θiyσ
√
1− ρ2 )
2
)
.
A.3. Technical Details in Section 4.3
In this general linear-exponential-quadratic game, the coupled HJB system can be written as
V it +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) + inf
αi∈Rni
∇xV i · (Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjα
j) +
1
2
θiV
i
(
xTQix+ (α
i)TRiα
i
) = 0,
V i(T,x) = θi exp
{
θi
2
xTMix
}
, i ∈ I.
(24)
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The optimal control satisfies
αi(t,x) = −R
−1
i B
T
i ∇xV i(t,x)
θiVi(t,x)
. (25)
In order to solve the system (24) directly for the Nash equilibrium, like in the second example, we
assume the following ansatz with the exponential form
V i(t,x) = θi exp
{
θi
(
1
2
xTP i(t)x+ pi(t)
)}
, i ∈ I,
where P i(t) ∈ Rn×n, pi(t) ∈ R are two functions of t to be determined. Using this ansatz, the
optimal control becomes
αi,∗(t,x) = −R−1i BTi P i(t)x.
Plugging the ansatz into (24), we deduce that P i(t) solves a matrix Riccati equation
P˙ i + (P i)TA+ATP i +Qi + (P
i)T(BiR
−1
i B
T
i + θiΣΣ
T)P i
− (P i)T
N∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
T
j P
j − (
N∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
T
j P
j)TP i = 0, P i(T ) = Mi,
and pi(t) solves the ODE
p˙i(t) +
1
2
Tr(ΣTP i(t)Σ) = 0, pi(T ) = 0.
We remark that these Riccati equations are coupled as well, and can be solved by high-precision
numerical integration.
To obtain the HJB equation for the individual decision problem decoupled by fictitious play, we
plugin(25) into (24) and deduce the simplified PDE
V it +
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV iΣ) +∇xV i · (Ax+
∑
j 6=i
Bjα
j) +
1
2
θiV
ixTQix
− 1
2
(∇xV i)TBiR−1i BTi ∇xV i
θiV i
= 0.
This PDE has the same form of (8), with
µi(t,x;α−i) = Ax+
∑
j 6=i
Bjα
j(t,x),
hi(t,x, y,z;α−i) =
1
2
θiyx
TQix− 1
2
zTΣ−1BiR−1i B
T
i (Σ
−1)Tz
θiy
.
Appendix B. Hyperparameters and Details of Deep Fictitious Play
This appendix reports the hyperparameters used in the numerical examples of Section 4. We fix
NSGD per stage = 100 and set Nsample = NSGD per stageNbatch. This means that the samples are never
reused in the learning. In all the numerical examples, the value functions V i are approximated by
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feedforward neural networks Net(t,x) with 3 hidden layers whose widths are all the same. We
use tanh as the activation function and adopt batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy (2015)) right
after each affine transformation and before activation. Each component of x0, the initial state Xi0,
is sampled independently from the uniform distribution on [−δ0, δ0]. δ0 is chosen such that in the
following process driven by the optimal policy α∗
dXα
∗
t = b(t,X
α∗
t ,α
∗(t,Xα
∗
t )) dt+ Σ(t,X
α∗
t ) dWt, X0 = x0,
the standard deviation of {Xt}Tt=0 is approximately δ0. In other words, δ0 is determined as a fixed-
point. The rationale for such a procedure is to make sure the data generated for the learning is
representative enough in the whole state space. We also test other reasonable choices of x0 and find
the final accuracy is insensitive to it. For the inter-bank game in Section 4.4 with N = 50 and the
superlinear dynamics (21), the optimal policy is unavailable for determining δ0. We instead use δ0
defined for the game with N = 50 and the linear dynamics (16).
Table 1 reports the values of some other hyperparameters used in the numerical examples.
Table 1: Hyperparameters and runtime for the numerical examples presented in Section 4.
Parameters / Problem Section 4.1 Section 4.2 Section 4.3 Section 4.4
NT 40 40 30 40
width of hidden layers 40 40 40 60
M (# of total stages) 80 100 200 400
Nbatch 256 512 512 256
learning rate 5e-4 5e-4 (5e-3, 5e-4)∗ 5e-4
runtime (hours) † 7 13 20.5 35
∗The learning rate is piecewise constant in the example of Section 4.3. It equals 5e-3 for the first half of SGD
updates and 5e-4 for the second half.
† The numerical experiments were conducted on an NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU. The runtime is subject to
further reduction with a multi-GPU system.
In Section 4.4 we solve the large scale multi-agent game with N = 50. Due to the intrinsic
symmetry of the game, we assume all the players essentially share the same strategies during each
stage of the fictitious play. Without loss of generality, we only keep track of player 1’s strategy and
denote its neural network approximation by
α1,m(t, x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = Net(t, x1, x2, . . . , xN ;w), (26)
where Net is a neural network and w denotes all the trainable parameters. Then player i’s strategy
(i 6= 1) is defined by swapping the components x1 and xi in the arguments, i.e.,
αi,m(t, x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = Net(t, xi, . . . , xi−1, x1, xi+1, . . . , xN ;w). (27)
This completes the simplification of Algorithm 1, whose pseudo-code is summarized in Algorithm 2
below.
Note that there are other ways besides (27) to define the others’ strategies based on (26), for
instance,
αi,m(t, x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = Net(t, xi, . . . , xi+1, x1, xi−1, . . . , xN ;w). (28)
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Due to the total symmetry of this game, the optimal strategy α1,∗ should be permutation invari-
ant with respect to the arguments x2, . . . , xN , which implies that (27) and (28) are the same if
Net(·;w) represents α1,∗ exactly. In the current algorithm, the plain feedforward neural network
does not guarantee this property, but we find different choices (like (27) and (28)) do not make a
substantial difference in final accuracy. On the hand, designing specific neural network architectures
to guarantee permutation invariance/equivariance exactly has been discussed in depth in the recent
literature (Zaheer et al. (2017); Zhang et al. (2018c); Sannai et al. (2019)). It will be of interest
to test in future work whether such networks can improve the performance in learning the Nash
equilibrium of totally symmetric games.
Algorithm 2 Deep Fictitious Play for Finding Markovian Nash Equilibrium of Symmetric Game
Require: N = # of players, NT = # of subintervals on [0, T ], M = # of total stages in fictitious
play, Nsample = # of sample paths generated for each player at each stage of fictitious play,
NSGD per stage = # of SGD steps for each player at each stage, Nbatch = batch size per SGD
update, α1,0 : the initial smooth policy for player 1
1: Initialize one deep neural network to represent V 1,0 for player 1
2: Define α2,0, . . . , αN,0 according to (27) and collect α0 ← (α1,0, . . . , αN,0)
3: for m← 1 to M do
4: GenerateNsample sample paths {X1,pik }NTk=0 according to (14) and the realized optimal policies
α−1,m−1(tk,X
1,pi
k )
5: for `← 1 to NSGD per stage do
6: Update the parameters of the neural network one step with Nbatch paths using the SGD
algorithm (or its variant), based on the loss function (13)
7: end for
8: Obtain the approximate optimal policy α1,m according to (7)
9: Define α2,m, . . . , αN,m according to (27) and collect the optimal policies at stage m:
αm ← (α1,m, . . . , αN,m)
10: end for
11: return The optimal policy αM
Appendix C. Robustness of the Deep Fictitious Play
Regarding robustness of the deep fictitious play, we did two more tests on the inter-bank game in
Section 4.1. Compared to the original parameter (see Eq. (20)), we solve two modified cases: (1)
increasing the game length T = 2 (with N increased to 100) instead of T = 1, and (2) increasing
the coupling a = 0.3 instead of a = 0.1. Figures 6 and 7 present the sample paths for each player
of the optimal state process Xit and the optimal control α
i
t vs. their approximations Xˆ
i
t , αˆ
i
t provided
by the optimized neural networks. In these two cases, the final RSE of V and∇V are (1) 4.1% and
0.2%, (2) 4.9% and 0.1%. We have not identified bifurcation in these experiments, which exists in
algorithms of solving mean field games (cf. Angiuli et al. (2018)). In other words, the performance
of deep fictitious play should be robust at least to a certain range of parameters.
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Figure 6: A sample path for each player of the inter-bank game in Section 4.1 with N = 10 and
the parameters in Eq. (20) except T = 2. Top: the optimal state process Xit (solid lines)
and its approximation Xˆit (circles) provided by the optimized neural networks, under the
same realized path of Brownian motion. Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit and αˆ
i
t
(dashed lines).
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Figure 7: A sample path for each player of the inter-bank game in Section 4.1 with N = 10 and
the parameters in Eq. (20) except a = 0.3. Top: the optimal state process Xit (solid lines)
and its approximation Xˆit (circles) provided by the optimized neural networks, under the
same realized path of Brownian motion. Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit and αˆ
i
t
(dashed lines).
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